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Abstract
We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets when individuals
take unobservable labor supply decisions. Precautionary labor motives intro-
duce countervailing incentives in the insurance market, and equilibria with
positive proﬁts can occur even in the standard case in which individuals ex-
ogenously diﬀer in risk only. We then extend the model to allow for both
privately known risks and labor productivities. This endogenously introduces
two-dimensional heterogeneity in the insurance market since precautionary la-
bor eﬀects lead to diﬀerences in income and hence risk aversion. Under these
circumstances, separating and pooling equilibria exist, which generally diﬀer
from those with exogenous two-dimensional heterogeneity considered by the
existing literature. Notably, in contrast to standard screening models, proﬁts
may be increasing with insurance coverage, and the correlation between risk
and coverage can be zero or negative in equilibrium, a phenomenon frequently
observed in empirical studies.
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1 Introduction
In the standard screening model going back to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), indi-
viduals diﬀer only in a single dimension, namely their risk of incurring a loss, and the
choice of an insurance contract is their only action explained endogenously. In this
simple framework, insurance companies can induce customers to fully reveal their
private information by oﬀering contracts that separate the risk types. In particu-
lar, equilibrium contracts are such that high risk individuals obtain more insurance
coverage than low risks. This positive correlation property has been the basis for
much of the empirical research trying to identify adverse selection in speciﬁc mar-
kets. Yet, several recent studies have found no evidence to support this prediction
of the standard screening model.1 This has been interpreted as indicating that the
importance of asymmetric information in these markets is smaller than previously
assumed. Subsequent empirical research, however, has shown that the absence of a
positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence does not imply
that there is no adverse selection. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), for instance, ﬁnd
strong evidence for adverse selection along contract features other than coverage in
the UK annuity market. In addition, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) show that
preference based selection in the US long-term care insurance market may oﬀset
risk based selection so that, in aggregate, those with more insurance are not higher
risk. Unfortunately, the basic screening model is not rich enough to account for such
phenomena.
Motivated by the empirical ﬁndings, one strand of theoretical literature has fo-
cused on combining adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance markets. In
these models, individuals can reduce their damage probability by an unobserved
eﬀort decision, which gives rise to moral hazard. To introduce adverse selection,
De Meza and Webb (2001) and Jullien et al. (2006) assume that individuals diﬀer
in their privately known risk attitude, which aﬀects their eﬀort decision.2 These
models can indeed generate equilibria where those with more insurance coverage
do not have a higher ex post risk. However, they do so by taking a number of
1See Cawley and Philipson (1999) for the US life insurance market, Chiappori and Salanié
(2000) for the French automobile insurance market, and Cardon and Hendel (2001) for the US
health insurance market.
2This idea was ﬁrst put forward informally by Hemenway (1990) and Hemenway (1992). Another
approach within this class of models, chosen by Stewart (1994) and Chassagnon and Chiappori
(1997), is to assume that agents diﬀer in their eﬀort cost, which is also private information. While
these models yield some interesting deviations from the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz model, such
as diﬀerent welfare implications and the coexistence of equilibria, they are unable to explain a zero
or negative correlation between ex post risk and insurance coverage.Introduction 2
additional assumptions. In contrast to the standard screening model, Jullien et al.
(2006) consider a monopolistic insurer. De Meza and Webb (2001) introduce ad-
ministrative costs that also drive a wedge between premiums and expected claims.
In addition, both models stick to a framework with one-dimensional heterogeneity
between agents where ex post risk and risk attitude are perfectly correlated.3 The
question remains whether their results extend to purely competitive settings that
allow for a less restrictive structure of heterogeneity.
Indeed, there exist theoretical contributions that extend the basic framework
of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to two-dimensional heterogeneity. Such models
of adverse selection in competitive insurance markets in which individuals diﬀer in
more than one private characteristic have been examined by Smart (2000), Wambach
(2000) and Villeneuve (2003). They assume that insurance customers diﬀer in wealth
and hence risk aversion in addition to risk, whereby the correlation between risk and
risk aversion is not assumed to be perfect. This exogenously introduces a second
dimension of heterogeneity. However, in these models, moral hazard is excluded
since the individuals’ only action is to choose an insurance contract. As standard
monotonicity properties hold in each of the two dimensions, countervailing incentives
and thus deviations from risk separation only emerge in these models if individuals
diﬀer in both characteristics so that the resulting eﬀects work in opposite directions.
Also, any equilibrium in such models will exhibit a positive correlation between
insurance coverage and risk occurrence.
In this paper, we combine the two approaches outlined above to construct a
model that can explain the empirical ﬁndings without assuming deviations from
perfect competition. In our model, individuals diﬀer in two dimensions and take
an additional action unobservable to the insurance companies. In contrast to the
standard moral hazard approach, however, this action does not aﬀect their dam-
age probability. A natural example of such a situation, which we focus on in this
paper, is a setting where individuals diﬀer in both their damage risk and their la-
bor productivity, and choose their labor supply endogenously. We examine possible
3De Meza and Webb (2001) assume that some individuals are risk-neutral and hence neither
purchase insurance nor take preventive actions. Their expected damage is therefore larger than
that of the individuals who purchase partial insurance and take preventive measures due to their
higher risk aversion. This generates a negative relationship between individuals’ risk and their
insurance coverage, even though in a rather special framework. See De Donder and Hindriks
(2006) for a more general analysis demonstrating which set of assumptions is needed to generate
such an equilibrium. Jullien et al. (2006) also consider a two type model only. They are mainly
concerned with the question how risk aversion aﬀects the power of incentives provided by the
optimal contract.Introduction 3
equilibria in competitive insurance markets when insurers cannot observe individual
risks, productivities, and labor supply. Obviously, this combines the typical informa-
tional assumptions underlying standard models of insurance markets and of optimal
taxation, which may make our model a useful starting point for analyzing further
questions of optimal tax policy in the presence of imperfect insurance markets.
Various interesting economic eﬀects emerge in such a model. First, optimal labor
supply reacts to the level of uncertainty and thus depends on the insurance market
outcome. On the other hand, the endogeneity of labor supply introduces counter-
veiling incentives in the insurance market as the individuals’ marginal willingness to
pay for insurance is inﬂuenced not only by their risk, but also their labor income.
We demonstrate how the resulting interactions between labor and insurance markets
aﬀect insurers’ ability to screen their customers. It will be shown that the insur-
ance market equilibrium will in general not be fully separating any more when labor
supply is endogenous. Also, in contrast to the models with exogenous diﬀerences in
income, equilibria in which the correlation between risk and insurance coverage is
negative can emerge. Thus, our model is able to explain this empirically relevant
phenomenon based on purely competitive insurance markets.4
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, fundamental results about labor
supply under uncertainty are derived, which will provide the basis for the subsequent
analysis of insurance market equilibrium. We demonstrate that, under broad and
meaningful assumptions, there is a motive for precautionary labor, i. e. individuals
work more in response to increases in risk. The resulting income change in turn
aﬀects their marginal willingness to pay for insurance. After having introduced the
model of the insurance market in section 3, we ﬁrst examine the resulting equilibria
when there is only one-dimensional heterogeneity and individuals diﬀer only in risk,
not in productivity. As will be shown in section 4, the endogeneity of labor supply
may make perfect screening impossible even in this simple framework. We then
proceed to the two-dimensional case in section 5 to show how the results of Smart
(2000), Wambach (2000) and Villeneuve (2003) are altered when endogenous labor
is allowed for. The main result of this analysis is the emergence of equilibria where
4Chiappori et al. (2006) show that the positive correlation property holds for a large class of
models, including competitive models and models with homogeneous risk aversion. This leads
Jullien et al. (2006) to conclude that their model with private risk aversion and a monopolistic
insurer is the only one that allows for a negative correlation when insurees have private information
(p. 17). Our model demonstrates that this is incorrect. In fact, the result by Chiappori et al.
(2006) is based on the assumption that, in competitive insurance markets, proﬁts do not increase
with coverage in the equilibrium set of contracts. As will turn out below, this property is not
necessarily satisﬁed in our model.Labor Supply under Uncertainty 4
those with more insurance are not higher risks in aggregate. Finally, section 6
concludes. The proofs of suﬃcient conditions for the existence of the equilibria
discussed in the paper are relegated to the appendix.
2 Labor Supply under Uncertainty
Models of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection imply that, in gen-
eral, not all uncertainty can be resolved. In order to introduce endogenous labor
supply in the standard adverse selection model by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),
we therefore need to derive the determinants of labor supply under uncertainty.
Notably, we focus on situations in which uncertainty results from an income inde-
pendent risk to consumption and labor supply is chosen before this risk is realized.5
This problem was ﬁrst examined by Netzer and Scheuer (2005) who used the in-
sights of Kimball (1990) to establish a theory of precautionary labor within a model
of taxation and social insurance. We brieﬂy discuss their results in this section.
Consider a Bernoulli random variable θ(β) that results from a possible damage
D which occurs with probability p and where the parameter β ∈ [0,1] stands for
the share of the damage that is insured. It can be used to vary both expected value
E[θ(β)] = p(1 − β)D and variance Var[θ(β)] = p(1 − p)[(1 − β)D]2 of the risk.
Preferences are characterized by an additively separable utility function U(c,L) =
u(c)+v(L) where c denotes consumption and L denotes labor supply.6 The standard
conditions u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0, v′(L) < 0 and v′′(L) < 0 are assumed. Denote the
productivity of an individual by w. Firms can observe w and pay wages according
to marginal productivity so that earned income is wL.
Note that the separability of preferences implies that leisure is a normal good.
In addition, let us assume the following:
Assumption 1. Utility u(c) displays non-increasing absolute risk-aversion.
This common and realistic assumption is needed to obtain precautionary labor
eﬀects in the following. The ﬁrst-order condition for labor supply L∗ that maximizes
5Eaton and Rosen (1980), Hartwick (2000) and Low (2005) model the case of endogenous
labor with wage uncertainty. While this gives rise to diﬀerent eﬀects, they also ﬁnd that larger
uncertainty should increase labor supply. Parker et al. (2005) ﬁnd empirical evidence in favor of
this prediction.
6We need the assumption of separability only to keep the exposition of our labor supply theory
concise. As shown by Kimball (1990), the results can be transferred to the case of nonseparable
utility. We assume the function v to be at least twice, u at least three times diﬀerentiable.Labor Supply under Uncertainty 5
expected utility in the presence of a given consumption risk θ(β0) is
wE[u
′ (wL
∗ − θ(β0))] = −v
′(L
∗), (1)
where E is the expectations operator. (1) is a standard condition stating that labor
supply is determined so as to equalize expected marginal utility and disutility from
work.7 To answer the question how risk aﬀects labor supply, we examine the move
from θ(β0) to the risk θ(β), β  = β0, which includes a change in variance and a change
in expected damage. The latter will have an income eﬀect on labor supply. To focus
on the pure variance eﬀect, we assume that the move from β0 to β is accompanied
by a decrease of income by (β − β0)pD, so that expected income remains constant.
This would for example be the case if insurance premiums were adjusted actuarially
fairly. We deﬁne the corresponding equivalent precautionary premium Ψ(β0,β) for
such a move implicitly as follows:8
E[u
′ (wL
∗ − θ(β0) − Ψ(β0,β))] = E[u
′ (wL
∗ − θ(β) − (β − β0)pD)]. (2)
Its interpretation is as follows. The expectation-neutral change in risk will have the
same eﬀect on the LHS of (1) and therefore on labor supply as a lump-sum reduction
of income by Ψ(β0,β). Both changes aﬀect the optimality condition in the same way.
Therefore, statements about the adjustment of labor supply induced by a change of
risk can be restated as income eﬀects triggered by a decrease of income by Ψ.
Using the moments of the Bernoulli distribution, we can obtain an explicit ex-
pression for ∂Ψ(β0,β)/∂β by diﬀerentiating (2). Notably, we are interested in the
value of this derivative at β = β0, which gives the income change that would have
the same eﬀect on labor supply as a small change in insurance, starting from a
situation with insurance β0. We obtain after a few rearrangements
∂Ψ(β0,β)
∂β














where ∆u′′(.) stands for the diﬀerence of u′′(.) between consumption levels in case
of no damage and damage, and E[u′′(.)] is the expected value of u′′(.).9
The ﬁrst bracketed term on the RHS of (3) is the generalized coeﬃcient of ab-
7The suﬃcient second order condition for a maximum is satisﬁed.
8As shown by Kimball (1990), the discussed premium is simply the equivalent risk premium
developed by Pratt (1964), applied to the ﬁrst derivative of u.
9The derivation makes use of the fact that Ψ(β0,β0) = 0 holds.The Model 6
solute prudence ηG. As β0 converges to 1, i.e. the examined situation converges to
a situation without risk, the coeﬃcient ηG converges to the prudence η as deﬁned
by Kimball (1990), which is simply the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion for the
function u′(.), i.e. η(c) = −u′′′(c)/u′′(c). From (3) follow our implications for labor
supply under uncertainty. First, note that a suﬃcient condition for ηG to be positive
is that u′′′(.) > 0. This, in turn, is implied by non-increasing risk aversion and hence
by our Assumption 1. An increase in insurance coverage β (compensated for its
eﬀect on expected damage) will therefore have the same eﬀect on labor supply as an
increase in income. Given that leisure is a normal good in our model with separable
preferences, this increases the demand for leisure and decreases labor supply.10 The
individual has a motive for precautionary labor. The size of the generalized prudence
ηG indicates how strong this motive is. Lemma 1 summarizes these ﬁndings.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, a compensated increase in insurance coverage re-
duces individuals’ labor supply. The strength of this eﬀect increases in the generalized
coeﬃcient of prudence ηG.
The precautionary labor eﬀect described in Lemma 1 will be the driving force
behind our results on possible insurance market equilibria. As individuals’ labor
income decreases in response to an increase in insurance, their marginal willingness
to pay for insurance increases given Assumption 1. This will aﬀect the insurers’
ability to screen their customers. Before we demonstrate this, however, we introduce
the model in the following section.
3 The Model
3.1 Preferences for Insurance
Consider a society of individuals characterized by their productivity wi, i = L,H,
and probability pj, j = L,H, of incurring a damage D, with the conventions wL <
wH and pL < pH. There is a continuum of individuals normalized to unit mass.
Let nij denote the number of individuals with productivity wi and risk pj. These
individuals will be referred to as ij−individuals. Let ¯ pi =
P
j(nijpj)/(niL +niH) be
the average risk in productivity group i and ¯ p =
P
i,j nijpj the average risk in the
entire population.
10The income eﬀect on labor supply can easily be derived by introducing a state independent
exogenous income T and implicitly diﬀerentiating (1) in this slightly changed setup.The Model 7
Individuals purchase insurance contracts that specify the share β ∈ ]0,1] of
the damage that is covered,11 and a premium d ∈ R+. Given such a contract
C = (βC,dC) from the contract space C = ]0,1] × R+, optimal labor supply can be
determined according to (1). It depends on the insurance contract and is denoted
by L∗
ij(βC,dC) or L∗
ij(C). Substitution into the expected utility function yields
the indirect expected utility function Vij(βC,dC) or Vij(C), from which indiﬀerence
curves in the (β,d)-space can be obtained. Throughout the paper, the notation
A > B implies that insurance contract A has a larger coverage and a larger premium
than contract B.
Lemma 1 implies that, when considering an individual’s preferences, we need to
account for changes in labor supply and thus consumption levels as we move along an
indiﬀerence curve in the (β,d)-space. On the one hand, labor supply is aﬀected by
precautionary motives. On the other hand, expected damage and premiums change
and cause income eﬀects on labor supply. Altogether, the endogeneity of labor
supply may alter the shape and crossing properties of indiﬀerence curves compared
to the canonical model by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).





ij − dC otherwise. Let us consider the slope of an indiﬀerence curve of an












ij) + (1 − pj)u′(c1
ij)
> 0, (4)
which is positive as in the standard model.12 Note also that MRSij = pjD at any
full coverage contract (where c0
ij = c1
ij holds), an additional result that carries over
from the standard model. However, while the curvature of indiﬀerence curves in the
(β,d)-space is always concave in the model with exogenous income, this does not nec-
essarily hold when labor supply is endogenous. Notably, if an increase in insurance
along an indiﬀerence curve leads to a strong reduction in labor supply, consumption
may decrease so much that the individual actually has a higher marginal willingness
to pay for insurance, given decreasing risk aversion. This would imply that indif-
ference curves are not globally concave, and complicate our equilibrium analysis
substantially. In the following lemma we derive a suﬃcient condition to exclude this
11Contracts with zero coverage are not relevant for our analysis. We exclude them to avoid
technical problems in the following proofs.
12Clearly, indiﬀerence curves are still continuous and diﬀerentiable since labor supply is a con-
tinuous and diﬀerentiable function of the insurance contract while utility is continuous and diﬀer-
entiable in labor supply.The Model 8
problem.
Lemma 2. Indiﬀerence curves are concave in the (β,d)-space if an increase in
insurance along an indiﬀerence curve leads to (weakly) larger consumption in case
of damage.
Proof. In order to examine how the marginal rate of substitution (4) changes as we move up on
the indiﬀerence curve d(β), we need to evaluate the sign of
∂ MRSij(β,d(β))
∂β















where the expression on the RHS follows from diﬀerentiating (4), substituting d(β) for d and some




ij) < 0 under Assumption 1, since c0
ij ≤ c1
ij
if β ≤ 1. It is also clear that ∂c1
ij/∂β < ∂c0
ij/∂β since the higher premium has to be paid in
both states of the nature while the larger beneﬁts are only received in case of damage. Hence
∂c0ij/∂β ≥ 0 along the indiﬀerence curve is a suﬃcient condition for (5) to be negative and thus
for the indiﬀerence curve to be concave.
Lemma 2 puts an upper bound on the precautionary labor eﬀect that will be
assumed to be satisﬁed for the remainder of this paper.
Apart from the shape of a given individual’s indiﬀerence curves, the crossing
properties of diﬀerent individuals’ indiﬀerence curves in a given insurance contract
are also crucial for the equilibrium outcomes. Let us ﬁrst ignore productivity diﬀer-
ences and consider individuals that only diﬀer in their risk. In the standard adverse
selection model where income is exogenous, it is easy to show that, at any given
contract, high risks have a steeper indiﬀerence curve than low risks. Put formally,
the marginal rate of substitution between coverage and premium given in (4) is in-
creasing in pj. Clearly, the property immediately follows from (4) if Lij is held ﬁxed.
By the following deﬁnition, we will refer to this as “regular crossing” of indiﬀerence
curves.
Deﬁnition 1. The indiﬀerence curves of two individuals that diﬀer only in risk
exhibit “regular crossing” at a given contract if the high risk’s indiﬀerence curve is
steeper (MRSiH > MRSiL). Otherwise, they exhibit “irregular crossing”.
Deﬁnition 1 introduces a local concept at a given contract. If regular crossing
holds in the whole contract space C, as it does in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, it
implies the global property of single crossing for indiﬀerence curves of two individuals
that diﬀer only in risk. As was shown by Netzer and Scheuer (2005), however,
regular crossing will not in general hold everywhere in the contract space due toThe Model 9
precautionary labor eﬀects. At any given contract with less than full coverage,
high risk individuals supply more labor than low risks. If this eﬀect is strong, the
resulting higher level of consumption may reduce the high risks’ marginal willingness
to pay for insurance below that of the low risks due to decreasing risk aversion.
The following lemma provides suﬃcient conditions for regular crossing even if labor
supply is endogenous.
Lemma 3. Regular crossing holds at a contract (β,d) ∈ C if either:
(i) the ratio pH/pL is suﬃciently large,
(ii) preferences exhibit CARA or a suﬃciently small degree of DARA,
(iii) the prudence ηG is suﬃciently small,
(iv) the contract provides full coverage.
Proof. See Netzer and Scheuer (2005), Appendix D.
If no one of the conditions (i) to (iii) is satisﬁed, the indiﬀerence curve of a
low-risk individual can be steeper than that of a high-risk individual in a contract
with less than full coverage. On the other hand, regular crossing always holds at
full coverage contracts. Together, these results show that the global single crossing
property can be violated for indiﬀerence curves of individuals that diﬀer in risk
only. This possibility is the crucial diﬀerence between our model and the existing
literature. The existence of precautionary labor eﬀects can introduce countervailing
incentives in the insurance market and prevent a simple ordering of the risks with
respect to their marginal rate of substitution between coverage and premium.
We next turn to individuals of the same risk but diﬀerent labor productivities.
To get clear-cut results for this case, the following assumption is used.
Assumption 2. Consumption is a normal good.
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 2 and DARA, the marginal rate of substitution at
contract (β,d) strictly decreases in productivity if β < 1. Under CARA or if β = 1,
the marginal rate of substitution is always constant in productivity.
Proof. In order to examine how productivity aﬀects the marginal rate of substitution between
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ij) = 0 if absolute risk-aversion is con-
stant or if the insurance contract provides full coverage so that c0
ij = c1
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(6) is negative if and only if L∗
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ij/∂wi > 0 denotes the pure substitution eﬀect based on the Hicksian labor supply
function Lc
ij and −∂L∗
ij/∂d < 0 is the pure income eﬀect. A suﬃcient condition for (7) to hold is
therefore that 1+wi(−∂L∗
ij/∂d) > 0, which is just saying that consumption is a normal good and
hence implied by Assumption 2.
Hence, under DARA, a low productivity individual’s indiﬀerence curve will be
steeper than the one of a high productivity individual of the same risk type in the
interior of the contract space. Clearly, since this local property holds everywhere,
it implies the global property of single crossing for indiﬀerence curves of individuals
that diﬀer only in productivity.
As we have seen, single crossing may be violated for individuals that diﬀer only in
risk. Of course it can also be violated for individuals that diﬀer in both dimensions.
For example, an LL-individual’s marginal rate of substitution might well be larger
than the one of an HH-individual somewhere in the interior of the contract space,
while it is ﬂatter at full coverage contracts according to the previous lemmas. This
could occur even if labor supply was ﬁxed, i. e. if income was exogenous, simply
because productivity and risk aﬀect the willingness to pay for insurance in opposite
directions. Hence this violation of single crossing can also occur in the models of
two-dimensional adverse selection by Smart (2000), Wambach (2000) and Villeneuve
(2003). In our model, however, single crossing can be violated even for HL- and
LH-individuals. This will occur if the reaction of labor supply to risk is suﬃciently
large, so that it dominates the eﬀect of productivity as discussed in Lemma 4.
With precautionary labor eﬀects, we cannot generally exclude the possibility
that any two indiﬀerence curves cut more than twice. This, however, would require
that utility functions exhibit highly irregular patterns. We shall exclude this with
the following assumption, which is a relaxation of the well-known Spence-Mirrlees
condition.
Assumption 3. Any two indiﬀerence curves of individuals that have diﬀerent dam-
age probabilities cut at most twice.
A graphical clariﬁcation of this double crossing property is provided by Smart
(2000). For any two types that diﬀer in risk (and possibly in productivity) the
contract space can be divided in two regions; one in which the high risks have aThe Model 11
larger marginal rate of substitution13 and one in which the opposite holds. The two
regions are separated by a line deﬁned by the points of tangency of the two types’
indiﬀerence curves. Each indiﬀerence curve cuts this line at most once.
3.2 The Screening Game
The screening game that we consider in the following goes back to Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). It consists of two stages. There is a large number of risk-neutral ﬁrms
who ﬁrst decide whether to enter the market or not. In case they enter, they decide
which contract to oﬀer. Each entering ﬁrm oﬀers exactly one contract (β,d) ∈ C.
The expected proﬁt of such a contract if it is purchased by a low-risk and b high-risk
individuals is given by
π(β,d,a,b) = a[d − pLβD] + b[d − pHβD]. (8)
Each entering ﬁrm pays a ﬁxed entry cost E > 0. At the second stage, customers
simultaneously choose labor supply and select their preferred contract from the set
of oﬀered contracts. In case of indiﬀerence between diﬀerent contracts, they opt for
the larger coverage contract.14 If several ﬁrms oﬀer the same contract, customers
split equally between them. Finally, the risk is realized, insurance payments are
made and consumption takes place.
We are interested in characterizing the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
of the described game. Of course, each insurance company must earn nonnegative
proﬁts in any such equilibrium. Second, it may not be possible for an inactive ﬁrm
to earn positive proﬁts by entering the market. This implies that there may be no
contract which earns proﬁts larger than E if oﬀered in addition by a new entrant.
As it will turn out, the equilibrium set of contracts can contain contracts which
earn positive proﬁts. Competition does not eliminate such contracts, because any
contract which is slightly more attractive to the consumers would also attract bad
risk types and become unproﬁtable. The existence of ﬁxed entry costs therefore
solves the problem of unlimited entry of ﬁrms. As more and more ﬁrms enter, less
customers will purchase from each of them, driving down the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Since
we are interested in perfectly competitive markets, however, we examine the limit
as E → 0.15
13This region includes all full coverage contracts.
14This convention follows the approach of Smart (2000). We will discuss alternative assumptions
where appropriate.
15This approach is due to Smart (2000). See De Meza and Webb (2001) for an alternative wayOne-Dimensional Heterogeneity 12
Equilibria can be categorized according to properties of the set of contracts which
are oﬀered. The following deﬁnition gives such a categorization.
Deﬁnition 2. An equilibrium is strictly pooling if all individuals purchase the same
contract. It is weakly pooling if the HH-individuals and/or the LH-individuals pur-
chase a contract which is also purchased by low risks. It is separating otherwise.
First, this deﬁnition categorizes equilibria only with respect to which damage
risks purchase which contract. This is because the major interest in terms of the
insurance market is how diﬀerent risks select themselves, or are “screened”. Second,
the focus on high risks for the deﬁnition of pooling will prove useful later. Pooling
requires all individuals of at least one type iH to be bunched in contracts with low
risks. Note ﬁnally that in any weakly but not strictly pooling equilibrium at least
two diﬀerent contracts will be oﬀered because not all individuals purchase the same
contract. Since, however, at least one high and one low risk type must be bunched
in one contract, it can contain at most three diﬀerent contracts.
4 One-Dimensional Heterogeneity
We ﬁrst assume that individual productivities are publicly observable. In that case,
insurance companies oﬀer contracts conditional on productivity, so that an insurance
market for each productivity group wi emerges. Individuals within each of these
markets diﬀer only in risk.16 We consider one such market, in which the concepts
of weakly and strictly pooling equilibria coincide. We proceed as follows. First,
general properties of equilibria are proven. More speciﬁc properties will depend on
the exact constellations of marginal rates of substitution in the contract space, and
will be described in the following corollary. The results of this section will then be
compared to the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz model, where individuals diﬀer only
in risk. We point out the diﬀerences in the form of testable hypotheses at the end
of the section.
to deal with the problem of positive proﬁts and perfect competition.
16The same results obtain if wL = wH so that there is no heterogeneity with respect to produc-
tivity, or if risk-aversion is constant. In that case, productivity has no inﬂuence on indiﬀerence
curves by Lemma 3.One-Dimensional Heterogeneity 13
4.1 Separating Equilibria
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium in the wi-market two contracts are oﬀered:
A = (βA,dA) = (1,pHD),
Bi = (βBi,dBi) = argmax ViL(β,d) s.t. (i) ViH(A) = ViH(β,d),
(ii) π(β,d,niL,0) ≥ 0.
The low risks purchase Bi, the high risks purchase A. Equilibrium exists if the
average zero proﬁt line of the market does not cut the iL−individual’s indiﬀerence
curve through Bi.
Proof. First, a pooling equilibrium with a pooling contract P = (βP,dP) cannot exist. Assume
to the contrary that it did, implying π(βP,dP,niL,niH) ≥ 0. For any contract C = (βC,dC) let
Bǫ(C) = {(β,d) ∈ C|(βC − β)2 + (dC − d)2 < ǫ2}, ǫ > 0, be the ǫ-ball around C in C. If MRSiL  =
MRSiH in P, then for any ǫ > 0, ∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P) s.t. ViL(P′) > ViL(P) and ViH(P′) < ViH(P). If




,niL,0) converge to π(βP,dP,niL,0) > 0 as ǫ → 0, a
contradiction to equilibrium. If MRSiL = MRSiH in P then βP < 1 due to regular crossing at full
coverage. But then for any ǫ > 0, ∃P ′ ∈ Bǫ(P) s.t. P′ > P, ViL(P′) > ViL(P), ViH(P′) > ViH(P)




,niL,niH) > 0 if oﬀered in addition to P, again a contradiction. This last
property holds since MRSiH > pHD > ¯ piD in the interior of C and hence in P (MRSiH = pHD at
full coverage and concavity of indiﬀerence curves), so that P ′ can be chosen above the pool’s zero
proﬁt line given that P was not below that line.










0 for any x ≥ 0 (the notation including x captures that A′′ might also attract low risks). Contract
Bi for iL-individuals follows since for any B′




i,niL,0) ≥ 0 and incentive







i ) > ViL(B′
i), it still satisﬁes




i ,niL,0) > 0.
The existence condition makes sure that ∄Q s.t. ViH(Q) > ViH(A), ViL(Q) > ViL(Bi) and
π(βQ,dQ,niL,niH) > 0, as shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
Proposition 1 shows that equilibrium will always by separating. However, more
speciﬁc results obtain. A crucial distinction arises depending on whether or not the
individuals’ indiﬀerence curves exhibit regular crossing at the contract where the
high risks’ indiﬀerence curve through A intersects the low risks’ zero proﬁt line.
Corollary 1. The contract Bi earns positive proﬁts if and only if MRSiH < MRSiL
(irregular crossing) in the contract where the high risks’ indiﬀerence curve through
A intersects the low risks’ zero proﬁt line.
Proof. Under regular crossing in the respective contract, the constraint (ii) in the deﬁnition of Bi
is binding. This holds since the double crossing assumption implies regular crossing in any largerOne-Dimensional Heterogeneity 14
contract C satisfying ViH(A) = ViH(C), so that the corner contract where (ii) is binding maximizes
ViL. Under irregular crossing, the contract that maximizes ViL is larger than the corner contract.
Regular crossing at full coverage together with the double crossing assumption then implies that
Bi is the unique point of tangency of the two types’ indiﬀerence curves, where (ii) is slack.
The separating equilibria are illustrated in Figure 1. The left panel depicts the
situation in which both equilibrium contracts earn zero proﬁts. It corresponds to the
standard Rothschild-Stiglitz contract set. The right panel depicts a situation where
Bi earns positive proﬁts, which requires irregular crossing and hence cannot occur in
the canonical model. As more and more ﬁrms enter and oﬀer the proﬁtable Bi, each
ﬁrm obtains a smaller share of the proﬁts until further entry becomes unproﬁtable.
Our results refer to the limit as the entry costs E converge to zero.
Figure 1: Observable Productivities
Note ﬁnally that imperfect separation might occur in the irregular crossing-case
whenever the assumption is dropped that individuals who are indiﬀerent pick the
larger coverage contract. In the case illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1, a
share γi ≤ ¯ γi of the iH-individuals might instead purchase contract Bi, where ¯ γi is
implicitly deﬁned by π(βBi,dBi,niL, ¯ γiniH) = 0.This consideration carries over to all
following cases in which positive proﬁt contracts exist in equilibrium. Then, some
share of the indiﬀerent customers bounded above by a zero proﬁt condition might
always pick the smaller coverage contract.
In sum, even without assuming two-dimensional heterogeneity, our screening
model with endogenous labor supply can explain deviations from the standard
Rothschild-Stiglitz model. First, contracts with positive proﬁts are possible in equi-Two-Dimensional Heterogeneity 15
librium. Second, low risks may pay actuarially unfair premiums. For purposes of
empirical testing, however, it may be of interest to derive predictions of our model
which allow to distinguish it from the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz model even if
all equilibrium contracts earn zero proﬁts. In fact, there are such implications of
our model. First, by Lemma 4, our model predicts a negative correlation between
productivity and the low risks’ insurance coverage. This implies that, second, pro-
ductivity shocks should have a larger eﬀect on low than on high risks’ labor supply
since the former are in addition aﬀected by the precautionary eﬀect from Lemma 1.
5 Two-Dimensional Heterogeneity
In this section, we assume that both individual characteristics, risk and productivity,
cannot be observed by the insurance companies.17 This implies that all four types of
individuals act on the same market. We also assume that preferences exhibit DARA,
so that diﬀerences in productivity are indeed relevant. We proceed as follows. We
again prove general properties of possible (separating and pooling) equilibria. More
speciﬁc equilibrium properties will then again depend on the exact constellations
of marginal rates of substitution in the contract space, and will be given in the
subsequent corollaries. In particular, we will highlight predictions that distinguish
our model from the contributions of Smart (2000), Wambach (2000) and Villeneuve
(2003).
5.1 Separating Equilibria
Proposition 2. In any separating equilibrium the contracts A = (βA,dA) = (1,pHD)
and Bi, i = L,H, are oﬀered, where
Bi = (βBi,dBi) = argmax ViL(β,d) s.t. (i) VHH(A) = VHH(β,d),
(ii) π(β,d,niL,0) ≥ 0.
Low risks with productivity wi purchase Bi. All high risks purchase A.
Proof. The deﬁnition of separation requires that no contract is purchased by diﬀerent risks, i.e.
that there exists (at least) a contract only purchased by high risks. Existence of A then follows
as in the proof of Proposition 1. Since A = argmax ViH(β,d) s.t. π(β,d,0,x) ≥ 0 for any x > 0,
17This would, for example, be a natural information assumption in a model of optimal taxation
in the presence of risk, where the government cannot observe productivities and risk but has to rely
on the observation of realized income (see Netzer and Scheuer (2005)). Private insurance markets
in such models work as described here.Two-Dimensional Heterogeneity 16
there can be no other (weakly) proﬁtable contract purchased only by high risks, i.e. both high
risk types purchase A. Lemma 4 implies that the HH-individuals’ indiﬀerence curve through A
is then relevant for incentive compatibility. The contracts Bi, i = L,H, follow as in the proof of
Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 does not mention existence conditions in the spirit of the condition
given in Proposition 1, where existence required that the average zero proﬁt line
of the whole market does not cut the low risks’ indiﬀerence curve through their
equilibrium contract. Similar conditions have to be satisﬁed in the present case as
well, but are more complicated. It has to be checked which of the four types would
be attracted away from the equilibrium candidate by a new contract. Proﬁtability of
such a contract is then calculated by comparing its position relative to the relevant
zero proﬁt line. Opposed to the standard case where there is only one zero proﬁt
line for the pool, we can have several diﬀerent pools and corresponding zero proﬁt
lines here. Hence, there will be more than one existence condition. It turns out
that four such conditions have to be satisﬁed in our model. They are derived and
discussed in the Appendix.
As before, the speciﬁc characteristics of the separating equilibrium will depend on
the slopes of the low risks’ indiﬀerence curves at the contract where the HH-type’s
indiﬀerence curves through A intersect the low-risks’ zero proﬁt line.
Corollary 2. Contract Bi earns positive proﬁts if and only if MRSHH < MRSiL
in the contract where the HH−individuals’ indiﬀerence curve through A intersects
the low risks’ zero proﬁt line. If π(βBL,dBL,niL,0) > 0 then BL > BH. Otherwise
BL = BH.
Proof. The ﬁrst statement follows as in the proof of Corollary 1. The second statement uses
Lemma 4 in addition. If π(βBL,dBL,niL,0) = 0 and hence MRSLL ≤ MRSHH in the corner
contract BL, it follows that MRSHL < MRSLL ≤ MRSHH there by Lemma 4, implying that
BL = BH. If π(βBL,dBL,niL,0) > 0, i.e. constraint (ii) is slack in the deﬁnition of BL, the
contract BL is deﬁned by the point of tangency of the HH-individuals’ indiﬀerence curve through
A and an indiﬀerence curve of the LL-individuals. By Lemma 4, MRSHL < MRSLL = MRSHH in
BL. The double crossing assumption then implies that BH < BL, where BH can either be a point
of tangency (π(βBH,dBH,nHL,0) > 0) or a corner solution (π(βBH,dBH,nHL,0) = 0).
The separating equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2, where the three diﬀerent
cases are depicted. The left panel illustrates the case where all contracts earn zero
proﬁts, since the low risks’ indiﬀerence curves are ﬂattest in contract BL = BH. The
middle panel illustrates that contract BL moves upwards on the HH-individuals’
indiﬀerence curve through A and thus earn positive proﬁts. This requires MRSLL >Two-Dimensional Heterogeneity 17
MRSHH in BH, a case that can occur even if labor supply is exogenous as discussed
in the introduction. Hence, the cases depicted in the ﬁrst two panels can already
occur in the models of Smart (2000), Wambach (2000) and Villeneuve (2003). The
last case, however, requires MRSHL > MRSHH, i.e. irregular crossing, which is
unique to our model. Therefore, the contract BH may also move up along the HH-
indiﬀerence curve through A and earn proﬁts in equilibrium. Hence, in contrast
to the models with exogenous income heterogeneity, our model is able to explain
actuarially unfair premiums and a larger coverage even for HL-individuals.
Figure 2: Unobservable Productivities / Separation
A number of observations are worth noting at this point. First, as mentioned
in footnote 4, Chiappori et al. (2006) claim that their “non-increasing proﬁts prop-
erty”, which implies that proﬁts do not increase with coverage in the equilibrium set
of contracts, is a general property of equilibrium in competitive insurance markets.
However, our ﬁndings show that this may not be the case. Indeed, the middle panel
of ﬁgure 3 provides an example of an equilibrium where proﬁts ﬁrst increase and
then decrease with coverage. Despite this deviation form the non-increasing proﬁts
property, the separating equilibria will always exhibit a positive correlation between
coverage and risk. This result will not, however, carry over to the possible pooling
equilibria discussed in the next subsection. Second, for the purpose of empirically
distinguishing our setting from that considered by Smart (2000), Wambach (2000)
and Villeneuve (2003), it may be useful to note that our model predicts a nega-
tive correlation between wH and the HL-types’ insurance coverage. Moreover, an
increase in wH should have a larger eﬀect on HL- than on HH-individuals’ labor
supply due to the additional precautionary eﬀect.Two-Dimensional Heterogeneity 18
5.2 Pooling Equilibria
Lemma 5. In any pooling equilibrium, the LH−individuals will be separated and
purchase A = (βA,dA) = (1,pHD). A strictly pooling equilibrium therefore does not
exist.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that a pooling equilibrium exists in which the LH-individuals are
bunched in a contract P with low risks, and P earns nonnegative proﬁts. Assume ﬁrst that the
other high risks (HH) purchase a diﬀerent contract C. It will then hold that VHH(C) > VHH(P),
since VHH(C) = VHH(P) would imply C > P and contradict VLH(P) > VLH(C), due to Lemma
4. Hence any contract P′ ∈ Bǫ(P) will not attract HH-individuals for ǫ small enough. Next, for
all low risk types iL that purchase P it has to hold that MRSiL = MRSLH in P, since otherwise
for any ǫ > 0, ∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P) s.t. ViL(P′) > ViL(P) for at least one of those low risk types,




,x,0) > 0, for any x > 0 (with the reason given in the proof of
Proposition 1). Hence positive proﬁts are earned if P ′ is oﬀered in addition to P, a contradiction.
Thus βP < 1 by Lemmas 3 and 4. Since MRSHL < MRSLL at any such contract, only one low
risk type iL purchases P. But then for any ǫ > 0, ∃P ′ ∈ Bǫ(P) s.t. P′ > P, ViL(P′) > ViL(P),




,niL+x,nLH) > 0, for any x ≥ 0, again for the reason described
in the proof of Proposition 1.
Assume next that the HH-individuals purchase P as well. MRSHH ≤ MRSLH holds in P
due to Lemma 4. For all low risk types iL purchasing P, MRSHH ≤ MRSiL ≤ MRSLH has to be
satisﬁed in P, since otherwise for any ǫ > 0 ∃P ′ ∈ Bǫ(P) s.t. ViL(P′) > ViL(P) for at least one




,x,0) > 0, for any
x > 0. Hence βP < 1 and for any ǫ > 0, ∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P) s.t. P′ > P, Vij(P′) > Vij(P) for all types
ij that purchase P, and P′ earns positive proﬁts if oﬀered in addition. This again holds since
MRSHH > pHD in the interior of C and hence in P (Lemma 2), so that P ′ can be chosen above
the pool’s zero proﬁt line given that P was not below that line. Therefore, LH-individuals cannot
be pooled with low risks. Existence of contract A follows as in the proof of Proposition 1.
Given that there cannot be a strictly pooling equilibrium by Lemma 5, three
possible candidates remain for a pooling equilibrium. In a “2–contract–equilibrium”,
the HH-individuals purchase the same contract as all the low risks. In addition,
there could be two diﬀerent “3–contract–equilibria“ in which one of the two low risk
types drops out of the pooling contract. The following three propositions character-
ize these three types of equilibria. Each is followed by a corollary that summarizes
the equilibrium’s proﬁt properties depending on the speciﬁc relations between the
types’ marginal rates of substitution between coverage and premium.
Proposition 3. In any weakly pooling “2-contract-equilibrium”, contracts A and P ∗
are oﬀered, where
P ∗ = (βP∗,dP∗) = argmax VLL(β,d) s.t. (i) VLH(A) = VLH(β,d),
(ii) π(β,d,nLL + nHL,nHH) ≥ 0.Two-Dimensional Heterogeneity 19
LH−individuals purchase A, all others purchase P ∗. Existence requires MRSHL ≥
MRSHH (irregular crossing) in P ∗.
Proof. The pooling contract P∗ in any 2-contract-equilibrium must satisfy constraint (ii). In
addition, given that contract A is oﬀered according to Lemma 5, P∗ must satisfy VLH(A) ≥
VLH(P∗). Assume VLH(A) > VLH(P∗) so that any contract P′ ∈ Bǫ(P∗) will not attract the
LH-individuals for ǫ small enough. But since MRSLL > MRSHL if βP
∗
< 1 and MRSLL =
MRSHL < MRSHH if βP
∗
= 1, MRSiL  = MRSHH holds in P∗ for at least one low risk type iL.
Therefore, for any ǫ > 0, ∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P∗) s.t. ViL(P′) > ViL(P∗) for at least one low risk type,




,x,0) > 0 for x > 0. Thus VLH(A) = VLH(P∗) must hold,
yielding constraint (i). Furthermore, P∗ < A and thus MRSHL < MRSLL, MRSHH < MRSLH in
P∗ according to Lemma 4. It also follows that MRSLL ≤ MRSLH in P∗ since otherwise for any





,nLL,0) > 0.18 If MRSLL < MRSLH in P∗, then constraint (ii) must be binding.





,nLL + nHL,nHH) > 0. Such a contract does not exist if MRSLL = MRSLH
in P∗, since any P′ for which VLL(P′) > VLL(P∗) also satisﬁes VLH(P′) > VLH(P∗). Constraint
(ii) can thus be slack. Altogether, this is equivalent to saying that P ∗ maximizes VLL subject to
(i) and (ii).
The additional condition that MRSHH ≤ MRSHL in P∗ follows since otherwise for any ǫ > 0
∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P∗) s.t. P′ < P∗, VHL(P′) > VHL(P∗), Vij(P′) < Vij(P∗) for all other types ij, and P′
earns positive proﬁts if oﬀered in addition.
Since existence of this type of pooling equilibrium requires irregular crossing, it
cannot exist in the models of two-dimensional heterogeneity but exogenous labor
supply analyzed by Smart (2000), Wambach (2000) and Villeneuve (2003). As
before, additional conditions have to be satisﬁed for existence. Notably, no contracts
may exist that attract away proﬁtable pools from the contract set described in the
Proposition. A complete discussion of these conditions is provided in the Appendix.
We proceed to show how more speciﬁc properties of the equilibrium depend on local
crossing-properties of indiﬀerence curves.
Corollary 3. Contract P ∗ earns positive proﬁts if and only if MRSLH < MRSLL
(irregular crossing) in the contract where the LH-individuals’ indiﬀerence curve
through A intersects the zero proﬁt line of the pool of all LL−, HL− and HH−individuals.
Proof. The proof follows exactly as for Corollary 1.
The two possible cases described in the corollary are depicted in Figure 3, where
the left panel refers to the case in which P ∗ earns positive proﬁts. In both cases,
18Note that similar arguments do not apply to any case in which the individuals’ marginal rates
of substitution diﬀer in P∗. A contract P′ > P∗ that attracts low risks might also attract the
LH-individuals due to the binding incentive compatibility constraint.Two-Dimensional Heterogeneity 20
the equilibrium is associated with a positive correlation between coverage and risk
since only high risks obtain full insurance. In addition, proﬁts are non-increasing
with coverage since the full insurance contract A always makes zero proﬁts.
Figure 3: Unobservable Productivities / 2-Contract Pooling
The next proposition characterizes the pooling equilibrium where type HL is
separated, called a “type I” equilibrium.
Proposition 4. In any weakly pooling “3-contract-equilibrium of type I”, contracts
A, P ∗∗ and C are oﬀered, where
P ∗∗ = (βP∗∗,dP∗∗) = argmax VLL(β,d) s.t. (i) VLH(A) = VLH(β,d),
(ii) π(β,d,nLL,nHH) ≥ 0.
C = (βC,dC) = argmax VHL(β,d) s.t. (i) VHH(P ∗∗) = VHH(β,d),
(ii) π(β,d,nHL,0) ≥ 0.
LH−individuals purchase A, the LL− and HH−individuals purchase P ∗∗, and
the HL−individuals purchase C. Existence requires MRSHL < MRSHH ≤ MRSLL
in P ∗∗.
Proof. Obviously, P∗∗ has to satisfy (ii) as given in the proposition. Given Lemma 5, VLH(A) ≥
VLH(P∗∗) also has to be satisﬁed. Assume VLH(A) > VLH(P∗∗), so that any P′ ∈ Bǫ(P∗∗)
satisﬁes VLH(A) > VLH(P′) for ǫ small enough, hence does not attract the LH-individuals. Then,





,nLL + x,0) > 0, for any x ≥ 0. If MRSLL = MRSHH in P∗∗ and therefore
βP
∗∗





,nLL + x,nHH) > 0, for any x ≥ 0. Thus VLH(A) = VLH(P∗∗) holds. Also, P∗∗ < A
and hence MRSHH < MRSLH, MRSHL < MRSLL in P∗∗. Next, MRSLL ≤ MRSLH in P∗∗
since otherwise ∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P∗∗) s.t. P′ > P∗∗, VLL(P′) > VLL(P∗∗), Vij(P′) < Vij(P∗∗) for all




,nLL,0) > 0. If MRSLL < MRSLH in P∗∗, then constraint (ii) must
be binding. If not, ∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P∗∗) s.t. P′ < P∗∗, VLH(P′) < VLH(P∗∗), Vij(P′) > Vij(P∗∗)




,nLL + x,nHH) > 0 for any x ≥ 0. Such a contract
does not exist if MRSLL = MRSLH in P∗∗, and constraint (ii) can be slack. Altogether, this
is just saying that P∗∗ maximizes VLL subject to (i) and (ii). Condition MRSHH ≤ MRSLL
in P∗∗ has to be satisﬁed since otherwise ∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P∗∗) s.t. P′ < P∗∗, VLL(P′) > VLL(P∗∗),




,nLL + x,0) > 0 for any x ≥ 0.
By Lemma 4, MRSHL < MRSLL in P∗∗ and single crossing within the productivity dimension.
Therefore, contract C  = P∗∗ for HL-individuals, for which VHL(C) ≥ VHL(P∗∗) and VLL(C) ≤
VLL(P∗∗) has to hold (incentive compatibility), must satisfy C < P∗∗. From MRSHH ≤ MRSLL ≤
MRSLH in P∗∗ and double crossing it follows that VHH(P∗∗) ≥ VHH(C) is the relevant incentive
compatibility constraint for C. The contract C then follows with the argument given for Bi in
the proof of Proposition 1. The condition MRSHL < MRSHH in P∗∗ makes sure that indeed
C  = P∗∗.
Note that the conditions on the marginal rates of substitution given in Propo-
sition 4 do not require irregular crossing. Even with exogenous labor supply and
two-dimensional heterogeneity, MRSHH ≤ MRSLL can occur since the respective
individuals diﬀer in both dimensions. The “3-contract equilibrium of type I” there-
fore exists in the models of Smart (2000), Wambach (2000) and Villeneuve (2003).19
A discussion of existence conditions in the spirit of Rothschild and Stiglitz can be
found in the Appendix. We proceed to illustrate how proﬁts in equilibrium depend
on local characteristics of the indiﬀerence curves.
Corollary 4. Contract P ∗∗ earns positive proﬁts if and only if MRSLL > MRSLH
(irregular crossing) at the contract where the LH−individuals’ indiﬀerence curve
through A intersects the zero proﬁt line of the pool of all LL− and HH−individuals.
Contract C earns positive proﬁts if and only if MRSHL > MRSHH (irregular cross-
ing) at the contract where the HH−individuals’ indiﬀerence curve through P ∗∗ cuts
the low risks’ zero proﬁt line.
Proof. The proof follows exactly as for Corollary 1.
While the discussed equilibrium can exist even with exogenous labor supply,
positive proﬁts can only occur with irregular crossing, hence only with endogenous
labor supply. For simplicity, both panels of Figure 4 depict a situation in which P ∗∗
19However, both Wambach (2000) and Villeneuve (2003) fail to realize this possibility. Wambach
(2000) makes a mistake in his argument and therefore erroneously concludes that pooling equilibria
do generically not exist. Villeneuve (2003) does not consider this possibility at all.Two-Dimensional Heterogeneity 22
earns zero proﬁts although this does not need to be the case by Corollary 4. C also
earns zero proﬁts in the left panel, but positive proﬁts in the right panel. As becomes
clear from Figure 4, the “3-contract-equilibrium of type I” always implies a positive
correlation between coverage and risk in aggregate. This is because the contracts
C, P ∗∗ and A are ranked with respect to both coverage and average risk of the pool
of customers. However, the non-increasing proﬁts property used by Chiappori et
al. (2006) to derive this positive correlation result is not necessarily satisﬁed. For
instance, it is possible that C, the contract with the lowest coverage, earns zero
proﬁts, whereas P ∗∗ > C earns positive proﬁts.
Figure 4: Unobservable Productivities / 3-Contract Pooling I
Finally, the last proposition characterizes the pooling equilibrium where type
LL is separated, called a “type II” equilibrium. As will turn out, it is particularly
interesting due to the arising correlation between risk and coverage.
Proposition 5. In any weakly pooling “3-contract-equilibrium of type II”, contracts
A, P ∗∗∗ and D are oﬀered, where
P ∗∗∗ = argmax VHL(β,d) s.t. (i) VLH(A) = VLH(β,d),
(ii) π(β,d,nHL,nHH) ≥ 0.
D = argmax VLL(β,d) s.t. (i) VLH(A) = VLH(β,d).
LH−individuals purchase A, the HL− and the HH−individuals purchase P ∗∗∗,
and the LL-individuals purchase D. Existence requires MRSHH ≤ MRSHL and
MRSLH < MRSLL in P ∗∗∗ (both irregular crossing).Two-Dimensional Heterogeneity 23
Proof. The fact that P∗∗∗ has to satisfy (i) and (ii) as given the the proposition follows exactly
as in the previous proof. Therefore P∗∗∗ < A and MRSHH < MRSLH, MRSHL < MRSLL in
P∗∗∗. Furthermore, MRSHL ≤ MRSLH has to hold in P∗∗∗, since otherwise ∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P∗∗∗)





x,0) > 0 for any x ≥ 0. If MRSHL < MRSLH in P∗∗∗, then constraint (ii) must be binding.
If not, ∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P∗∗∗) s.t. P′ < P∗∗∗, VLH(P′) < VLH(P∗∗∗) and Vij(P′) > Vij(P∗) for both




,nHL + x,nHH) > 0 for any x ≥ 0. Such a contract does
not exist if MRSHL = MRSLH in P∗∗∗, and constraint (ii) can be slack. Altogether, this is just
saying that P∗∗∗ maximizes VHL subject to (i) and (ii). Condition MRSHH ≤ MRSHL in P∗∗∗
has to be satisﬁed since otherwise ∃P′ ∈ Bǫ(P∗∗∗) s.t. P′ < P∗∗∗, VHL(P′) > VHL(P∗∗∗) and




,nHL + x,0) > 0 for any x ≥ 0.
As in the proof of the previous proposition, MRSHL < MRSLL in P∗∗∗ and single crossing in the
productivity dimension implies D > P∗∗∗. It immediately follows that π(βD,dD,nLL,0) > 0. From
MRSHH ≤ MRSHL ≤ MRSLH in P∗∗∗ and double crossing, the relevant incentive compatibility
constraint for D will be VLH(A) ≥ VLH(D). It must be binding and MRSLL = MRSLH must hold





,nLL,0) > 0. This, however, is just saying that D maximizes VLL subject to the
constraint VLH(A) = VLH(D), as given in the proposition. MRSLH < MRSLL in P∗∗∗ makes sure
that indeed D  = P∗∗∗.
The existence of the type II equilibrium is unique to our model, since it re-
quires irregular crossing of indiﬀerence curves. Most important is the fact that D,
purchased by low risks that have a low productivity, has a larger coverage βD and
premium dD than the pooling contract P ∗∗∗. Hence, if nLH and nHL are suﬃciently
small, low risk individuals, which then mainly consist of LL-types, purchase on av-
erage more insurance (contract D) than high risks, which are mainly HH-types who
purchase P ∗∗∗ < D. This gives rise to a negative correlation between risk and cover-
age in equilibrium and might help to explain the empirical puzzle that the positive
correlation between risk and coverage predicted by the previous screening models
is not observed although adverse selection seems to be a relevant phenomenon in
insurance markets. Most interestingly, this negative correlation result is obtained
without assuming any deviations from perfect competition and without assuming
a one-dimensional structure with only two types as in De Meza and Webb (2001)
and Jullien et al. (2006). It is simply based on the possibility of irregular crossing,
which in turn naturally results from our setup with two-dimensional heterogeneity
and endogenous labor supply.
A discussion of the existence conditions for this type of equilibrium is relegated
to the Appendix. We proceed to illustrate how proﬁts in equilibrium depend on
local characteristics of the indiﬀerence curves.Conclusion 24
Corollary 5. Contract P ∗∗∗ earns positive proﬁts if and only if MRSHL > MRSLH
(irregular crossing) at the contract where the LH−individuals’ indiﬀerence curve
through A intersects the zero proﬁt line of the pool of all HL− and HH−individuals.
Contract D always earns positive proﬁts.
Proof. The proof follows exactly as for Corollary 1.
The two possible cases described in the corollary are depicted in Figure 5. As
Corollary 5 and the ﬁgure make clear, the non-increasing proﬁts assumption used
by Chiappori et al. (2006) to derive the positive correlation property is again not
satisﬁed. In fact, D will always make more proﬁts per capita than P ∗∗∗ although
D > P ∗∗∗ since it is only bought by low risks. Thus, the non-increasing proﬁts
property cannot be considered as a general characteristic of equilibrium in compet-
itive insurance markets as soon as multidimensional heterogeneity and unobserved
actions are accounted for.
Figure 5: Unobservable Productivities / 3-Contract Pooling II
6 Conclusion
Based on recent empirical ﬁndings, the theoretical literature on adverse selection has
started to realize that screening in most relevant real-world situations is associated
with more than one dimension of privately known heterogeneity, and that the result-
ing countervailing incentives signiﬁcantly alter the nature of equilibrium compared
to the standard model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). These models, however,Conclusion 25
typically assume that all dimensions of heterogeneity are given exogenously. For in-
stance, the contributions by Smart (2000), Wambach (2000) and Villeneuve (2003)
consider competitive insurance markets where individuals diﬀer in both risk and risk
preference. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ﬁnd equilibria in these settings where
the correlation between risk occurrence and insurance coverage is zero or negative,
a phenomenon that has frequently been observed in empirical studies.
In this paper, we asked the question how insurance market equilibrium may look
like if heterogeneity in some dimensions is not given exogenously but arises from
the individuals’ choices. As a natural example of such a situation, we considered a
model where individuals not only diﬀer in risk and select an insurance contract, but
also choose their labor supply endogenously, which aﬀects their income and hence
risk attitude. While it may not be obvious at ﬁrst glance why this endogeneity
should be relevant, it turned out that the interdependency between insurance market
equilibrium and labor supply leads to economic eﬀects that have an impact on
possible equilibrium conﬁgurations. Notably, it allows for “irregular crossing” in
the sense that, among individuals who exogenously only diﬀer in risk, high risk
individuals have the lower marginal willingness to pay for insurance than low risks
since they supply more labor and hence are less risk averse.
We show that this possibility will generally lead to equilibria with (i) smaller
correlations between risk and coverage than in the standard models, and (ii) positive
proﬁt contracts. The latter result might lead to imperfectly separating equilibria
even in the simple case of one-dimensional heterogeneity. If individuals diﬀer in
both their risk and productivity, equilibria can (i) pool diﬀerent risk types in one
contract, (ii) violate the non-increasing proﬁts property of Chiappori et al. (2006),
and therefore (iii) exhibit a zero or negative correlation between risk and coverage.
Interestingly, this latter result provides an explanation for the empirical ﬁndings
without assuming non-competitive insurance markets or special restrictions on the
structure of heterogeneity as in De Meza and Webb (2001) and Jullien et al. (2006).
Our model raises a number of issues for further research. First, our informational
assumption that risk, productivity and labor supply are privately known by the
individuals may make our model a helpful tool for the analysis of policy questions
such as taxation under risk and social insurance. Models addressing these issues need
to combine multidimensional heterogeneity with the endogenous choice of private
insurance and labor supply. We show how this set of assumptions aﬀects the working
of insurance markets. Natural questions to ask are about the eﬀects of labor taxes
or social insurance in this framework, and, more generally, about the eﬃciencyReferences 26
properties of the equilibria that arise in our model.
Furthermore, as pointed out above, the possibility of irregular crossing is the driv-
ing force behind our novel results on competitive screening equilibria. Our model of
insurance markets with two-dimensional heterogeneity and endogenous labor supply
is just one - though certainly natural - example of a situation where irregular crossing
can arise. Our results extend, however, to other settings of competitive screening
with irregular crossing preferences. Generally, such preferences can endogenously
result from some unobserved decision that does not aﬀect the agent’s risk, but only
risk aversion. This may not only be a relevant phenomenon to be accounted for in
models of insurance, but also of credit markets, portfolio choice, or labor contracts.
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7 Appendix
In section 5, equilibria were characterized but the question was not addressed
whether such equilibria in fact exist. In this appendix, we provide necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of the equilibria. As in the model by Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976), the fundamental condition for existence is that there is
no contract outside the equilibrium set of contracts that attracts a proﬁtable pool
of individuals. In looking for such potentially proﬁtable deviations, we can conﬁne
ourselves to the area between the zero proﬁt lines of the high and low risks. Clearly,
a contract below the low risks’ zero proﬁt line could never be proﬁtable. Contracts
above the high risks’ zero proﬁt line, in turn, would not attract any individual given
the equilibria from section 5.
Figure 6 illustrates this area. The thick black lines represent the high and low
risks’ zero proﬁt lines. We ﬁrst turn to the separating equilibria deﬁned in Proposi-
tion 2. Figure 6 shows the indiﬀerence curves of the four types through the contracts
A and BL = BH of the separating equilibrium for the case that all contracts make
zero proﬁts (see Corollary 2). Based on this graphical representation, the neces-
sary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of this equilibrium can be stated as
follows:
Corollary 6. The separating equilibrium where all contracts make zero proﬁts de-
ﬁned in Corollary 2 exists if and only if the conditions from Corollary 2 are satisﬁed
and there is no contract E
(i) in area I in ﬁgure 6 such that π(βE,dE,nLL,nHH) > 0,
(ii) in area II such that π(βE,dE,nHL + nLL,nHH) > 0,
(iii) in area III such that π(βE,dE,nLL,nHH + nLH) > 0, and
(iv) in area IV such that π(βE,dE,nHL + nLL,nHH + nHL) > 0.
Proof. Necessity follows from Corollary 2 and the fact that, if one of the conditions (i) to (iv) is
not satisﬁed, a proﬁtable pooling contract exists that destroys the equilibrium. For suﬃciency, noteAppendix 29
Figure 6: Existence of Separation
ﬁrst that a contract in any other area between the zero proﬁt lines of the low and high risks either
attracts no individual or only high risks. It therefore cannot be a proﬁtable deviation. Moreover,
the crossing properties of the indiﬀerence curves implied by Lemma 4 and Assumption 3 rule out
the emergence of other relevant areas.
Hence, in contrast to the standard case considered by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), four conditions instead of just one need to be satisﬁed in order to guarantee
existence. In the proof of the following Corollary, we show that the existence condi-
tions from Corollary 6 analogously apply to the other separating equilibria deﬁned
in Corollary 2.
Corollary 7. Conditions (i) to (iv) from Corollary 6, together with the relevant re-
lations between the marginal rates of substitution, are also suﬃcient for the existence
of the other separating equilibria deﬁned in Corollary 2.
Proof. For the equilibrium where only BL makes positive proﬁts, note that there exists an addi-
tional area to the left of area II and below the HL-types’ indiﬀerence curve through BH representing
contracts that would attract HH- and HL-types (see the middle graph in ﬁgure 2). However, if
condition (ii) from Corollary 6 is satisﬁed, we must have π(βE,dE,nHL,nHH) < 0 for all contracts
E in this new area. First, the zero proﬁt line of the pool of HH- and HL-types lies above the zeroAppendix 30
proﬁt line from condition (ii). Second, the HL-types’ indiﬀerence curve through BH is concave by
Lemma 2. Together, this ensures that, if condition (ii) is satisﬁed, the zero proﬁt line of the pool
of HH- and HL-types lies above the new area where only these types are attracted.
For the equilibrium where both BL and BH make positive proﬁts, the area with contracts
attracting only HH- and HL-types described above also exists but cannot contain proﬁtable
contracts if condition (ii) is satisﬁed by the same argument as above. In addition, in this case,
Assumption 3 does not rule out that the indiﬀerence curves of the LH- and of the LL-types and
those of the LH- and the HL-types cross again above the low risks’ zero proﬁt line (see right
graph in Figure 2). Then, new areas compared to Figure 6 can emerge. However, contracts in
these areas would either attract only high risks or a pool of HL-, HH- and LH-types, which cannot
be proﬁtable if condition (iv) is satisﬁed.
We now turn to the existence of pooling equilibria. First, the 2-contract-equilibrium
from Proposition 3 is considered. Figure 7 graphically represents the equilibrium
contracts A and P ∗ together with the relevant indiﬀerence curves for the case that
P ∗ makes positive proﬁts (see Corollary 3). The necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for its existence are as follows:
Figure 7: Existence of 2-Contract Pooling
Corollary 8. The weakly pooling 2-contract-equilibrium where P ∗ makes positive
proﬁts deﬁned in Corollary 3 exists if and only if the conditions from Proposition 3Appendix 31
and Corollary 3 are satisﬁed and there is no contract E
(i) in area I in Figure 7 such that π(βE,dE,nHL,nHH) > 0,
(ii) in area II such that π(βE,dE,nLL,nLH) > 0, and
(iii) in area III such that π(βE,dE,nLL + nHL,nLH) > 0.
Proof. Necessity is implied by Proposition 3, Corollary 3, and the fact that, if one of the conditions
(i) to (iii) is not satisﬁed, there is a contract outside the equilibrium set that attracts a proﬁtable
pool. Suﬃciency is established by showing that if conditions (i) to (iii) hold, no other area in
Figure 7 can contain proﬁtable deviations. This is obvious for the areas in which contracts would
attract no individual or only high risks. Moreover, contracts in the area below area III cannot make
positive proﬁts if condition (iii) is satisﬁed. This is because, ﬁrst, they are cet. par. associated
with a lower premium than those in area III and, second, attract a less favorable pool (all the
population rather than all except the HH-types). The same holds for contracts in the area to the
right of area I in Figure 7. They attract a pool of LH-, HH- and HL-individuals and therefore
cannot be proﬁtable given condition (iii) and the concavity of indiﬀerence curves. Finally, it can
be easily shown that even if the indiﬀerence curves of the HH- and HL-types or of the HH- and
LL-types cross again (be it below or above contract P ∗), the resulting new areas cannot contain
proﬁtable contracts given conditions (i) to (iii).
Hence, in contrast to the separating equilibria, only three existence conditions
are needed for this type of pooling equilibrium. Concerning the existence conditions
for the weakly pooling 2-contract-equilibrium where P ∗ makes zero proﬁts, only
two slight modiﬁcations are necessary. First, contracts in area I could never be
proﬁtable. They attract HH- and HL-types and hence a less favorable pool than
P ∗, which lies above them and just makes zero proﬁts. Therefore, condition (i) in
Corollary 8 is not needed for the existence of this equilibrium. Second, contracts
in the area to the right of area I would attract all individuals who purchase P ∗ in
this case, which could not be proﬁtable for the same reason as above. All the other
arguments would remain unchanged. Thus, only the two conditions (ii) and (iii)
from Corollary 8 would be needed to guarantee the existence of the weakly pooling
2-contract-equilibrium when P ∗ makes zero proﬁts.
Next, let us consider the weakly pooling 3-contract-equilibrium of type I deﬁned
in Proposition and Corollary 4. Figure 8 shows the case where both P ∗∗ and C
make zero proﬁts. Based on this illustration, we can derive suﬃcient and necessary
conditions for the existence of this pooling equilibrium in the following corollary.
Corollary 9. The weakly pooling 3-contract-equilibrium of type I where all contracts
make zero proﬁts deﬁned in Corollary 4 exists if and only if the conditions of Propo-
sition 4 and Corollary 4 are satisﬁed and there is no contract E
(i) in area I in Figure 8 such that π(βE,dE,nHL + nLL,nHH) > 0,Appendix 32
Figure 8: Existence of 3-Contract Pooling I
(ii) in area II such that π(βE,dE,nLL,nLH) > 0, and
(iii) in area III such that π(βE,dE,nHL + nLL,nHH + nLH) > 0.
Proof. Both necessity and suﬃciency are established as in the proof of Corollary 8. For suﬃciency,
note that contracts in the area to the left of area I cannot be proﬁtable if condition (i) is satisﬁed.
This follows from the fact that, in this area, only HH- and HL-types are attracted and hence
the corresponding zero proﬁt line must lie above the one from condition (i). Together with the
concavity of the HL-types’ indiﬀerence curve through C, this ensures that there cannot be a
proﬁtable deviation in this area. By the same argument, contracts in the area between areas II
and III in ﬁgure 8 are not proﬁtable if condition (ii) is satisﬁed. Moreover, the contracts represented
by the area above area I cannot be proﬁtable as they would attract the LH- and LL-types only
but lie below this pool’s zero proﬁt line. Finally, the crossing properties of the indiﬀerence curves
implied by Lemma 4 and Assumption 3 rule out other relevant areas.
Again, Corollary 9 and Figure 8 need to be changed only slightly when P ∗∗ or C
make positive proﬁts. First, if P ∗∗ makes positive proﬁts and thus lies at a point of
tangency of the LH- and LL-types’ indiﬀerence curves, area I would attract HL-,
LH- and HH-individuals. In addition, the area to the left of area I would contain
potentially proﬁtable contracts attracting HL- and HH-individuals. This would
need to be ruled out by a fourth condition. Second, if contract C is not on the lowAppendix 33
risks’ zero proﬁt line but at a point of tangency of the HH- and HL-types indif-
ference curves, another area compared to Figure 8 appears. However, it represents
contracts that only attract high risks and are therefore not proﬁtable. Hence, no
modiﬁcation of the existence conditions from Corollary 9 would be necessary.
Finally, Corollary 10 and Figure 9 and give the existence conditions for the
pooling 3-contract-equilibrium of type II deﬁned in Proposition and Corollary 5.
We focus on the case where P ∗∗∗ makes zero proﬁts.
Figure 9: Existence of 3-Contract Pooling II
Corollary 10. The weakly pooling 3-contract-equilibrium of type II where P ∗∗∗
makes zero proﬁts deﬁned in Corollary 5 exists if and only if the conditions of Propo-
sition 5 and Corollary 5 are satisﬁed and there is no contract E
(i) in area I in Figure 9 such that π(βE,dE,nLL,nLH) > 0, and
(ii) in area II such that π(βE,dE,nLL + nHL,nLH) > 0.
Proof. Again, the proof is as for Corollary 8. Concerning suﬃciency, note that contracts in the
area to the left of area II cannot be proﬁtable if condition (ii) is satisﬁed. This follows from the
fact that, in this area, only LH- and HL-types are attracted and hence the corresponding zero
proﬁt line must lie above the one from condition (ii). Together with the concavity of the HL-types’
indiﬀerence curve through P∗∗∗, this ensures that there cannot be a proﬁtable deviation in thisAppendix 34
area. By an analogous argument, contracts in the regions below this area and below area II are
not proﬁtable if condition (ii) is satisﬁed. Finally, contracts in the area to the Southwest of P ∗∗∗
cannot be proﬁtable since they would attract all individuals who purchase P∗∗∗, which lies above
them and makes zero proﬁts.
As can be easily veriﬁed, Corollary 10 applies without modiﬁcations to the case
that P ∗∗∗ makes positive proﬁts. Hence, whether the pooling contract makes proﬁts
or not, only two existence conditions are needed for the pooling 3-contract equilib-
rium of type II.